On Gellman's Attempted Rescue by Maitzen, Stephen
193
ON GELLMAN’S ATTEMPTED RESCUE
STEPHEN MAITZEN
Acadia University
I thank Jerome Gellman for his critique of my recent article “Ordinary 
Morality Implies Atheism.”1 In that article, I argued that traditional the-
ism threatens ordinary morality by relieving us of any moral obligation 
to prevent horrifi c suff ering by innocent people even when we easily can. 
Gellman attempts to rescue that moral obligation from my charge that 
theism destroys it. I believe his attempted rescue fails.
Gellman begins by quoting the main principle on which my argu-
ment depends, the principle sometimes called “theodical individualism” 
that I abbreviated with the initials “TI”:
 (TI) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suf-
fering only if such suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for 
the suff erer.
He then correctly notes that theism—the proposition that God exists—
and TI together imply (to use Gellman’s numbering)
 (3a) Necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ulti-
mately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer.
However, Gellman gives reasons to reject the claim in my argument that 
(3a) implies (again, his numbering)
 (3c) We never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, invol-
untary human suff ering.
1 Jerome Gellman, “On God, Suff ering, and Th eodical Individualism,” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2:1 (2010): 187-191, replying to Stephen Maitzen, 
“Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1:2 
(2009): 107–26. Further references to these works will cite author and page number only.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 1 (2010), PP. 193–198
194 STEPHEN MAITZEN
Th at is, he claims to preserve our ordinary moral obligation even if the-
ism and TI are true.
I’ll argue that the reasons Gellman gives fail to answer my challenge, 
because they’re implausible reasons on two independent grounds. First, 
his reasons confuse cases in which God’s permission of suff ering is justi-
fi ed by some benefi t to the suff erer (cases that therefore are relevant to 
TI) with cases in which God confers a benefi t in an attempt to compen-
sate the suff erer (cases that therefore aren’t relevant to TI). Second, his 
critique assumes that God might face constraints that there’s no good 
reason to think a perfect being could face.
COMPENSATION VS. JUSTIFICATION (AGAIN)
Gellman writes, “Let P be any person that I allow to endure suff ering, 
instead of preventing the suff ering. And let S be the particular instance 
of suff ering that P undergoes.” His critique of my argument then asserts 
that the following propositions are “not implausible, granting God’s exist-
ence and perfect goodness”:
 (G1) God has so created the world that God is able to produce for P 
a degree, D, of good for P that will make P’s existence worth-
while.
 (G2) God will bring about D for P. Th is will not be in the form of 
compensation but a result produced by P’s history.
 (G3) D is a maximal degree of good that God can produce for P.
 (G4) God will bring about D for P whether P suff ers (this particular) 
S or not. If P suff ers S, then God will produce a net good from S 
for P, to off set the evil of S in order to reach D.2
Whether or not Gellman’s propositions are plausible, at least two of 
them are simply irrelevant to my argument. In my article, I took pains 
to distinguish justifi cation from mere compensation, and in doing so I 
quoted Christian philosopher Eleonore Stump’s version of the idea that 
TI tries to capture: “if a good God allows evil,” says Stump, “it can only be 
2 Gellman, 188.
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because the evil in question produces a benefi t for the suff erer and one 
that God could not produce without the suff ering.”3 I then wrote,
Like Stump’s use of it, TI’s use of the word “produces” is signifi cant, because 
otherwise we allow that God’s mere compensation of the suff erer—say, in 
a blissful aft erlife—can justify God’s permission of suff ering even if the suf-
fering bears no necessary connection to the good that compensates for it. 
Without such a connection, the good may compensate for the suff ering but 
can’t morally justify God’s permission of it.4
Gellman’s proposition G2 gestures at the diff erence between compensa-
tion and justifi cation. However, I fi nd G2’s claim that God brings about D
“as a result produced by P’s history” mysterious. If D is a result produced 
by P’s history, how is it that God brings about D? Is it because God brings 
about P’s history? If so, then God exercises a degree of “meticulous 
providence” that many theologians would reject. In the end, however, 
I can only guess at the meaning of G2.
More important, neither G2 nor G4 ever says or even hints that S is 
necessary for, or the best means of, God’s securing D for P. As Stump 
seems to recognize, when we ask whether someone’s permission of suf-
fering is justifi ed by its relationship to some benefi t for the suff erer, we 
ask (in part) whether the permission is necessary, or if not strictly nec-
essary then optimal, for securing the benefi t.5 Nothing in G2 or G4 re-
quires or even suggests an affi  rmative answer to that question in the case 
of God, P, S and D. On the contrary, G4 says that God will secure D for 
3 Eleonore Stump, “Th e Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 392–423; 
411–12.
4 Maitzen, 110, emphasis in original. I continued: “Consider an analogy to our or-
dinary moral practice. My paying you money aft er harming you may compensate for my 
harming you, but it doesn’t justify my harming you. Only something like the necessity 
of my harming you in order to prevent your harming me or an innocent third party has 
a chance of justifying my behavior: some necessary connection must hold between the 
harm and the benefi t.”
5 See also Maitzen, 115, again quoting Stump; the fuller quotation from Stump 
reads, “other things being equal, it seems morally permissible to allow someone to suff er 
involuntarily only in case doing so is a necessary means or the best possible means in the 
circumstances to keep the suff erer from incurring even greater harm” (“Providence and 
the Problem of Evil,” in Christian Philosophy, ed. Th omas P. Flint [Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990], 51–91; 66).
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P regardless of whether God permits S to occur, in which case it’s hard to 
see how D plays any role in justifying God’s permission of S in particular. 
In light of this problem, it won’t do simply to stipulate, as G2 does, that 
God’s bringing about D for P isn’t merely compensation for S, especially 
when G4 encourages the suspicion that it is merely compensation. G2 
and G4 are, so far as I can see, simply irrelevant to whether God is justi-
fi ed in permitting S and hence irrelevant to the implications of TI.
A HAMSTRUNG GOD?
Th e fi nal proposition that Gellman off ers as “not implausible” is quite 
a mouthful even though he describes it as “a claim about our ordinary 
morality”:
 (G5) One can morally allow P to suff er S if and only if the net benefi t 
to P from allowing S will far outweigh S, and either: (a) the net 
benefi t to P from allowing S will be far greater than the good 
that will be P’s if one prevents S, or (b) the net benefi t to P from 
one’s allowing S will not be less than the good that will be P’s if 
one prevents S, and allowing S will signifi cantly increase the net 
good in the world.
While one might doubt that something as complex as G5 does in fact 
govern our ordinary moral reasoning, let’s grant that it does. Gellman 
says that G5 preserves the moral obligation that I claim theism and TI 
jointly threaten, because according to G5 we can be obligated to prevent 
S even if God’s permission of S satisfi es TI’s requirement of a net benefi t 
to P. For, unlike TI, G5 requires that the benefi t to P not just outweigh 
but far outweigh S, and G5 imposes a further, disjunctive condition on 
top of that.
If G5 is so plausible, does it also bind God? Gellman says it does: 
“G5 obligates God no less than it does mere mortals. And since God is 
a perfect being God will faithfully fulfi ll the dictate of G5.”6 In that case, it 
would certainly appear, God is justifi ed in permitting only the suff ering 
6 Gellman, 191.
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that G5 justifi es us in permitting. If so, however, then we don’t have the 
moral obligation that Gellman wants to rescue. Because God is perfect 
in knowledge, power, and goodness, any suff ering that occurs is suff er-
ing that God permits (else he lacks perfect power or perfect knowledge) 
and is justifi ed in permitting (else he lacks perfect goodness). So if we’re 
justifi ed in permitting S whenever God is justifi ed in permitting S, we’re 
always justifi ed in permitting S. Th ere goes morality.
Remarkably enough, Gellman tries to avoid this unwanted implica-
tion by having God plead other commitments. According to Gellman, 
God is stuck with
juggling God’s obligations to all human persons.... All human beings are 
turned to God with an equal claim to a personal maximal net benefi t, every-
thing else being equal. Th us, God’s obligations to others besides P are of vastly 
greater dimensions than that of any human being to other persons. [Hence] 
God might be justifi ed in allowing suff ering. . .in vastly many cases, while 
humans have relatively sparse permission to do so.7
Th us Gellman retracts his earlier assertion that G5 obligates God and 
that God “will faithfully fulfi ll the dictate of G5,” for he allows God to opt 
out of G5 if other commitments prevent God from honoring it.8
I can’t see how a perfect being could be hamstrung in the way Gell-
man suggests. In Gellman’s story, God isn’t obligated to prevent S because 
God has commitments to others besides P, commitments that force God 
to allow S (or else somehow justify God’s allowing S even though they 
don’t force it). Nevertheless, he says, we can be obligated where God isn’t, 
because we don’t have God’s excuse: unlike God, we don’t have an equal 
obligation toward every human being. So God sometimes needs us to 
prevent suff ering by P that God himself can’t prevent without failing in 
his duty to someone other than P. I can’t how see a perfect being could 
fi nd itself in such a pickle. I oft en need a little help from my friends: “Can 
7 Gellman, 191, emphasis in original.
8 Gellman writes that “the suff ering God allows a person to endure is such that God 
allows it either: (i) so as to produce for that person a degree of good that is maximal for 
that person and also satisfi es the conditions of G5, or: (ii) because allowing it follows 
from God’s juggling God’s obligations to all human persons” (191). I interpret (ii) as 
the “out” clause Gellman off ers God, because (ii), unlike (i), makes no mention of God’s 
satisfying G5.
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you pick up Jack? I promised him a ride, but I also promised to pick up 
Jill elsewhere at the same time, and I can’t be in two places at once.” But 
Gellman claims to be describing the supremely independent God of clas-
sical monotheism, not a limited being like me.
Gellman faces a dilemma: Does God honor his obligation to P under 
G5 or not? If yes, then allowing S confers a benefi t to P that far outweighs 
S (and achieves other good things too), in which case, as I argued in my 
article, we have no obligation to prevent S. If no, then why doesn’t God 
honor his obligation to P? Presumably because God can’t honor it and 
also honor his obligations to others besides P, which is exactly the situ-
ation I face in my example. It doesn’t matter how God ends up in my 
predicament, since it’s implausible enough to think that God could end 
up in my predicament.
Gellman might reply that we can’t know that a perfect God isn’t ham-
strung by constraints that force God to permit S when he’d  rather pre-
vent it. But surely the burden of proof rests with whoever suggests that 
such limitations apply to a perfect God. In any case, I hope nobody of-
fers the hoary suggestion that God’s constraints include a commitment 
never to interfere with our libertarian free will, a suggestion I criticized 
in my article because it contradicts the biblical account of God’s conduct, 
overstates the value we actually attach to free will, and otherwise fails to 
jibe with ordinary morality.
